International Congress on Eurasian Economies
26-28 June 2024 – Bishkek, KYRGYZSTAN
Paper properties
Paper ID : 2929
Status : Paper accepted
Language : Turkish
Topic : International Trade and Globalization
Presenter: Mr. Ali Ertuğrul
Session : 7A Bölgesel Ekonomi
The Effect of "Political Economy" on International Trade through Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements and the Case of Türkiye – Kyrgyzstan
“Politik İktisat”ın Çifte Vergilendirmeyi Önleme Anlaşmaları Yoluyla Uluslararası Ticarete Etkisi ve Türkiye – Kırgızistan Örneği
- Mr. Ali Ertuğrul (Turkish Aerospace (TUSAŞ), Türkiye)
- Mr. Berkay Cihan (Ministry of Treasury and Finance, Türkiye)
Abstract
This paper studies the taxation regime, which is one of the tools of "Re-Political Economy," and tax policies, economic agents, political factors, and fiscal policy in this scope. This paper also examines the Agreement on Double Tax Avoidance, which was signed in Ankara on August 26, 1999, between Turkey and Kyrgyzstan under the taxation regime. Political economy, starting from the 15th century to the present day, has not been conceptually consensus due to the natural changes of the concepts of society, state and trade in history, and has sometimes been included in the science of morality and sometimes in the natural sciences. In fact, "Political Economy" examines the political factors with which economic agents will be used in state administration and how these factors will be used. Taxation policies are effective fiscal policy instruments. Double Tax Avoidance Agreements aim to eliminate the negative effect on international trade. It is held to expand international trade both in volume and amount, taking into account the balance of the agreement and the economic and commercial relations with the state that is a party to the agreement. The paper also does not ignore the need to focus on the following issues, including taxation policies included in fiscal policies: a) the effects on international trade (international economics); b) the effects of international policies on the costs or profits of merchants who are parties to foreign trade transactions; and c) the effects of states on tax revenues in their inevitable desire to collect taxes.
JEL codes: F59, H30, H39
